Comments on: http://gowers.openrightsgroup.org/2006-03/29/ Open Rights Group Fri, 21 Apr 2006 15:33:54 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.2 hourly 1 By: André R. http://gowers.openrightsgroup.org/2006-03/29/comment-page-1/#comment-17 André R. Thu, 16 Mar 2006 02:12:49 +0000 http://gowers.openrightsgroup.org/?p=29#comment-17 d, e Patent inflation is a problem for many patent offices, quote: "The delegation of the U.S. noted that the U.S. had been dealing with its examination backlog on its own by employing more examiners but such a way of solution was not a sustainable one, was a waste of R&D human resources, and that developing countries should not model after this method. It stressed that countries should promote mutual exploitation of search/examination results. .. EPO also mentioned that its productivity enhancement measure using the office automation technology had been reaching its limit, and that search/examination cooperation with other IP Offices was essential." (http://www.jpo.go.jp/torikumi_e/kokusai_e/wipo_high_level_kekka.htm) Patents = tools against too much competition ---> competition - patents trade-off I recommend a "patent budget" for the patent offices controlled by the European Central Bank. Inventive step or not? Difficult. But: inventive step(application A) > inventive step (application B) Take a maximum of say 1 million patents (patent budget) and then let inventors compete. Only the best applications will get awarded a patent (olympic model). The patent office is free to allocate the patent budgets over different classes. The result: patent quality gets maximized and the problem of patent inflation is gone. If a patent system faces a quality problem the patent budget will get reduced. Similar to monetary policy with a view to combat inflation such a budget system will combat trivial patents inflation and force the patent offices to improve their examination. An external independend authority which controls the patent budget will also review the patent system. Our current problem is that the patent system defines its own policies and even takes part in lobbying the legislator or represents national legislature on the EU council/EPO board level. De facto self-governance. Why is it dangerous? Naturally a patent authority defends the interests of the users or of patent attorneys or its own institutional interests! economic objectives of the patent system. So institutional checks&balances are needed. E.g. supervision by competition enforcement authorities, an external review by economists, or an annual patent budget. d, e

Patent inflation is a problem for many patent offices, quote:
“The delegation of the U.S. noted that the U.S. had been dealing with its examination backlog on its own by employing more examiners but such a way of solution was not a sustainable one, was a waste of R&D human resources, and that developing countries should not model after this method. It stressed that countries should promote mutual exploitation of search/examination results.
.. EPO also mentioned that its productivity enhancement measure using the office automation technology had been reaching its limit, and that search/examination cooperation with other IP Offices was essential.” (http://www.jpo.go.jp/torikumi_e/kokusai_e/wipo_high_level_kekka.htm)

Patents = tools against too much competition
—> competition – patents trade-off

I recommend a “patent budget” for the patent offices controlled by the European Central Bank.

Inventive step or not? Difficult. But: inventive step(application A) > inventive step (application B)

Take a maximum of say 1 million patents (patent budget) and then let inventors compete. Only the best applications will get awarded a patent (olympic model). The patent office is free to allocate the patent budgets over different classes.

The result: patent quality gets maximized and the problem of patent inflation is gone.

If a patent system faces a quality problem the patent budget will get reduced. Similar to monetary policy with a view to combat inflation such a budget system will combat trivial patents inflation and force the patent offices to improve their examination. An external independend authority which controls the patent budget will also review the patent system.

Our current problem is that the patent system defines its own policies and even takes part in lobbying the legislator or represents national legislature on the EU council/EPO board level. De facto self-governance. Why is it dangerous? Naturally a patent authority defends the interests of the users or of patent attorneys or its own institutional interests!
economic objectives of the patent system.

So institutional checks&balances are needed. E.g. supervision by competition enforcement authorities, an external review by economists, or an annual patent budget.

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